The Concept of Resilience from a Normative Perspective: Examples from Dutch Adaptation Strategies by Keessen, A.M. et al.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/119314
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-05 and may be subject to
change.
Copyright © 2013 by the author(s). Published here under license by the Resilience Alliance.
Keessen, A. M., J. M. Hamer, H. F. M. W. Van Rijswick, and M. Wiering. 2013. The concept of resilience
from a normative perspective: examples from Dutch adaptation strategies. Ecology and Society 18(2): 45.
http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-05526-180245
Research, part of a Special Feature on Law and Social-Ecological Resilience, Part II, Contributions from Law for Social-
Ecological Resilience Symposium Stockholm, Sweden, 2010
The Concept of Resilience from a Normative Perspective: Examples from
Dutch Adaptation Strategies
Andrea M. Keessen 1, Jurrien M. Hamer 2, Helena F. M. W. Van Rijswick 1 and Mark Wiering 3
ABSTRACT. Both in academic literature and political practice, resilience is becoming a central evaluative concept for assessing
climate adaptation policies. This makes sense because society’s main challenge in an altering the environment is to adapt to the
inevitable changes. However, applying the concept of resilience to devise adaptation strategies reveals that social-ecological
resilience acquires different meanings depending on the social context. There is no straightforward application of resilience. In
this contribution, it will be argued that giving meaning to the concept of resilience in adaptation strategies requires making
normative choices. These choices concern whether there is a public interest in adaptation, the distribution of private and public
responsibilities, and striking a balance between individual rights and general interests. Because these normative choices can be
questioned and revised, it is important that they are made explicit to enable a democratic debate on the direction that adaptation
strategies should take. Simply referring to the concept of resilience in an adaptation strategy does not suffice, but occludes this
discussion. Through formulating and applying a condensed scheme of politico-theoretical approaches that underpin diverging
adaptation approaches, this contribution reveals the various underlying normative assumptions and explicates the relevant
political choices. Three Dutch adaptation strategies serve as empirical examples. They illustrate the importance of the societal
context in giving meaning to resilience in the development of adaptation strategies.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the uncertainty about the kind of impacts that climate
change may have in particular settings, many countries are
developing plans and programs to guide adaptation and to
become more resilient (Biesbroek et al. 2010). Part of this
adaptation process consists of making purposeful changes to
governance arrangements to make them better equipped to
respond to climate change (Cosens 2010, Termeer et al. 2011,
Ruhl 2011). The resilience literature suggests that public
actors should involve private actors in the development of
adaptation strategies (e.g., Ostrom 1990, Folke 2006,
Armitage 2008, Pahl-Wostl 2008, Cosens 2010, Huntjes
2011). Another emerging factor is the emphasis on market-
based regulatory mechanisms, which can entail a shift from
public responsibilities for adaptation to climate change toward
private responsibilities too (H. Mees, J. Dijk, D. van Soest, P.
Driessen, H. Runhaar, and H. F. M. W. Van Rijswick,
unpublished mansucript). These changes in the governance
approach call into question the meaning of traditional and
accepted normative principles that underlie contemporary
governance and management practices (Driessen and Van
Rijswick 2011).  
Creating a policy for adaptation to climate change requires a
specific meaning to be given to resilience by defining the
public interest and establishing a division between public and
private responsibilities for adaptation (Cohen and Arato 1994,
Dubbink 2003). Whether adaptation is in the public interest
and, if so, to what extent, should be made explicit to enable
public debate about the direction of adaptation efforts. We
provide a framework for an analysis of the plans and programs
designed to make societies and their physical environments
more resilient in the face of climate change, to discover which
implicit or explicit justification they offer for what is in the
public interest, and whether this results in different divisions
of public and private responsibilities. Although the scope of
this paper is largely theoretical, we will illustrate our
arguments with three empirical examples from the context of
three Dutch adaptation policies.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The social context of resilience
Adaptation plans generally aim to decrease vulnerability to
climate change and increase resilience (Folke 2006).
Resilience can thus be seen as the opposite of vulnerability
(Levina and Tirpak 2006). From a normative perspective,
resilience can function as a criterion to evaluate the quality of
a strategy for adaptation to climate change (Adger 2006,
Driessen and Van Rijswick 2011). Although resilience seems
to be a straightforward concept, when applied to social systems
it can either be a positive or a negative property. Resilience
can reflect the ability of a system to adapt to change, but also
the ability of a system to persist despite change (Gunderson
and Light 2006). This ambiguity is amplified by the various
meanings that adaptation to climate change can have.
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Adaptation can be directed toward offering protection against
climate change, retreating in the face of climate change, or
accommodating climate change through transformation. 
Using the concept of resilience in a social context therefore
requires answering tough questions about the direction that
adaptation should take. What society do we want to preserve
or to reorganize into? If resilience is about making society
more resilient in the sense of being better able to cope with
climate change, then how does it relate to the institutions that
make society work and the principles on which these
institutions are built? Is adaptation to climate change in the
public interest and therefore a public task, or is it, fully or
partly, a private responsibility? The concept of resilience
needs to be linked to other concepts so as to reflect the social
element of social-ecological resilience and to enable an
explanation to be found for the various courses of action that
adaptation plans can propose to increase resilience. 
On the basis of several empirical studies Ebbesson (2010)
identified the following elements as particularly relevant for
the assessment of social-ecological resilience: (1) flexibility
in social systems and institutions to deal with changes; (2) the
openness of institutions so as to provide for broad
participation, not least in local decision making and
administration; (3) the effectiveness of multilevel governance;
and (4) social structures that promote learning and adaptability
without limiting the options for future development.  
These are elements of adaptive management, which is
generally put forward in the literature as the solution to
improve social-ecological resilience (cf. Folke et al. 2005).
However, adaptive management in itself does not determine
the direction that adaptation policies are, or could be, taking.  
Linking resilience with the concept of legitimacy reflects that
adaptation efforts need strong societal support and a shared
and internalized sense of urgency to become successful, i.e.,
to increase social-ecological resilience (Van Rijswick and
Salet 2012). Legitimacy is more than openness and
participation. It also includes accountability, the rule of law,
fairness, equity, and, in the end, effectiveness. These elements
also appear relevant in the context of adaptation to climate
change (H. Mees, J. Dijk, D. van Soest, P. Driessen, H.
Runhaar, and H. F. M. W. Van Rijswick, unpublished
mansucript). However, what is considered legitimate differs
strongly depending on the normative values to which one
adheres. To determine the direction of the improvement of
social-ecological resilience that adaptation policies can take,
it is essential to understand on which normative values an
adaptation policy can be based.
Five different theories
A key mechanism for understanding which meaning an
adaptation strategy gives to social-ecological resilience is by
analyzing how people define what is in the public interest and
how the government should act (Alexander 2002). Societies
differ in the way they conceptualize the public interest in
adaptation. Different perceptions of what is in the public
interest represent different ideas about what should be public
or private responsibilities, which balance should be struck
between individual rights and general interests, and what is
found to be just. On the basis of the literature on public interest
we have selected five diverging political theories: limited
rights, extensive rights, utilitarian, socialist, and communitarian
theory. It can be argued that far more political or legal theories
could be part of the research and that focusing on these
traditional approaches is not appropriate because they may not
be able to deal with the governance of climate adaptation
policies as a new and serious problem. It is indeed possible to
extend the amount of theories, but our choice to focus on these
well-known theories is that most political parties still rely on
these political theories for their theoretical and normative
underpinning. Although other theories may offer a more
nuanced or more specific approach, they all have to deal with
the same questions: how to deal with individual interests and
rights and collective interests; should policies be based on an
anthropocentric, an ecological, or a combined approach;
should policies be based on social or economic arguments,
should policies be based on a rights-based approach, or should
there be room for solidarity and how to deal with the
distributional effects of new policies? Because a full overview
of all possible underpinning theories would be too difficult to
cope with here, we have chosen to discuss the classical political
theories to explain our argument. The normative guidance that
these political theories offer makes preferences in adaptation
strategies more explicit.  
1. Limited rights theories define what is just by referring to
the core freedoms of man. The ideal state guarantees that
people can live in safety, but does not do much else. The
rights that must be protected are negative, in that they are
about what other persons and the government may not
do to someone (see for an elaboration of the distinction,
Berlin 1969). A just government is a modest government,
a guardian of peace, not a provider of welfare. The
dominant limited rights theory is libertarianism. The
fundamental value of libertarianism is ‘self-ownership’
(Nozick 1974). It is based on respecting the spaces in
which people need to lead their own lives and make their
own choices (Nozick 1974, see also Kymlicka 2002).
Self-ownership does not entail a positive obligation,
neither for the state nor for people to help others to be
autonomous. When faced with adaptation to climate
change, a libertarian approach does not justify
empowering the state to take large-scale measures,
because social-ecological resilience means for them that
citizens are able to cope themselves with environmental
hazards, for instance through private insurance.
Consequently, the state is not authorized to take
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adaptation action and if people have not taken out
insurance, the state should not compensate their damage. 
2. Extensive rights theories forcefully expand the
responsibilities that governments have. Instead of
negative rights, they establish numerous positive rights
that governments must safeguard. The dominant
extensive rights view is liberalism. The core concept of
a liberal thinker is individual autonomy, i.e., all
individuals must have the space and the opportunity to
lead worthwhile lives (Rawls 1973, Anderson and
Honneth 2005). This does not only include the protection
of rights, e.g., the freedom of speech, but also the
provision of adequate healthcare, good education, and a
minimum of social security. Although governments have
an essential obligation to support citizens, individuals
still have their own responsibilities.  
Liberals differentiate between choice-sensitive responsibilities
and endowment-sensitive duties (Kymlicka 2002).
Choice-sensitivity means that however pitiable people
may be, they remain responsible for their own choices
(Kymlicka 2002). Endowment sensitivity implies that
unchosen circumstances that cannot be influenced must
be taken into account (Dworkin 1985, Kymlicka 2002).
The challenge for liberals is where to draw the line
between the two. Considering adaptation to climate
change, a liberal interpretation of resilience legitimates
the involvement of the state to ensure that the costs and
damage that result from climate change are not only borne
by the people who are harmed (Farber 2007). Obviously,
some people are more at risk of suffering damage from
climate change than others. The pivotal question is
whether they choose this risk and are therefore
responsible for it themselves, or whether it is simply bad
luck and therefore they deserve assistance. Liberals
would consider that a public adaptation plan improves
resilience if it respects private autonomy and only
compensates those who deserve public assistance. 
3. In contrast to these rights approaches, utilitarians seek to
understand the ethical problems from a more scientific,
economic perspective. According to a utilitarian, all
moral claims should be measured in terms of overall
utility and brought under one moral rule: actions are just
when they contribute to the greatest happiness for the
greatest amount of people. Importantly, utilitarians
identify happiness as the experience of pleasure, and its
opposite as the experience of pain (Bentham 1789, Mill
1861). Therefore, from a utilitarian perspective, there is
no more and no less than an aggregation of individual
interests that are objectified into an idea of the public
interest. Consequently, utilitarians can accept a public
adaptation plan and will find that it improves resilience
if it maximizes utility. Therefore, it should be based on
a cost-benefit analysis (Alexander 2002). 
4. Many strands of more state-based, collectivist thought
exist, ranging from Marx and Lenin to Western social
democrats. Their most important claim is that capitalism,
when left to its own devices, will generate an unfair
society. Marx argued that because the owners of the
means of production, like factories or simply capital,
bought the labor of the masses, while keeping for
themselves the surplus value of their toils, the laborers
would end up in a position of servitude (Wood 1972).
Nowadays, socialist parties still adhere to the opinion that
if the government does not stringently regulate the
economic market, the average person will be oppressed
and exploited by the richer one. As normal interaction
between private agents gives rise to exploitation, the
government necessarily has to step in.  
Although many varieties exist (Arneson 1994, Cohen
1999), people inspired by neo-Marxism or radical
democracy as well as social democrats frequently
advocate both an outcome and an opportunity type of
equality (Cohen 2000). This encompassing notion of
equality has led politicians to advocate a welfare state.
Because the state was the institution that had both the
power and the democratic legitimacy to intervene in
society, it was obliged to compensate for capitalism’s
drawbacks. Along the lines of collectivist reasoning it is
stated that solely relying on private adaptation initiatives
cannot improve resilience because it will lead to
inequality. They will prefer public adaptation strategies
to deal with distributional effects. In their view, public
action should improve resilience by ensuring equal
adaptation opportunities and outcomes for all. 
5. Communitarians do not take individuals and their rights
as a starting point, but instead emphasize the social or
communal environment of the individual. Self-
determination, which forms the root of human rights,
means little without the social environment that gives a
person the possibility to make use of his or her freedom.
They assume that without certain moral ideals,
individuals are not capable of making good use of their
freedom (Kymlicka 2002). Social structures provide
someone with the values, norms, and also the practical
options that allow him or her to make choices. Identity
is not something that is presocially given, but something
that is deeply influenced and, according to some theorists,
even constituted, by the community in which one lives
(Sandel 1982). Communitarian values can therefore take
all kinds of forms (Kymlicka 2002). When
communitarian arguments are used, the type of
governmental adaptation action can assume almost any
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shape as long as it is connected to the community values.
Communitarians might therefore prefer to improve
resilience through private adaptation. They might also
support a governmental adaptation plan if it seeks to
improve resilience by protecting the ‘way of life’ of the
community.
EMPIRICAL EXAMPLES FROM THE
NETHERLANDS
Empirical research can unearth the meaning that is given to
social-ecological resilience in an adaptation policy. It clarifies
the underlying normative choices related to different political
theories. Which political theory has informed the adaptation
policy and determined the direction of adaptation can be
determined empirically by analyzing: (1) on which normative
values the adaptation policy is based, (2) how responsibility
is divided between the state and the citizens, and (3) which
instruments have been proposed.  
Obviously, in a democratic society, several of the above
political theories can coexist and it is possible that more than
one theory has influenced an adaptation policy. A comparison
with older policies that impact the same resource or area can
reveal whether a shift has occurred in thinking about values,
the desired involvement of the state, and individuals or the
instruments that are used. Such a shift can be due to a changed
political context, a changed physical context, or due to the fact
that climate change is a new societal and ecological problem
that asks for shifts in traditional policy approaches because of
its particular characteristics. What in a certain case may be the
main reason for a shift can only be concluded after extensive
empirical research into adaptation measures. In this paper we
make a start with this empirical research. The empirical
analysis of normative choices underlying adaptation policies
will take place in the context of three case studies from the
Netherlands.
Characteristics of the Netherlands
The Netherlands is situated in a delta and more than half of its
territory is below sea level (Fig. 1). It is a densely populated,
prosperous country, especially in the part below sea level. It
is extremely sensitive to the impacts of climate change because
it has to deal with sea level rises, in the North Sea, and
increasing water discharges from major European rivers (Van
den Hurk et al. 2006). The Ems, Scheldt, Meuse, and Rhine
rivers all flow through the Dutch Delta to discharge into the
North Sea. It is estimated that flood risks have increased
exponentially in the 20th century and will further increase in
the 21st century (Ligtvoet et al. 2009, De Moel et al. 2011, Te
Linde et al. 2011). As well as high water risks in winter there
are also risks connected to the low discharges of rivers and
low precipitation, especially during summer, leading to
periods of drought that are harmful for Dutch agriculture as
well as for the maintenance of river dikes (Van Duinen et al.
2011).
Fig. 1. Flood map of the Netherlands. Source: Landelijk
Beheer Organisatie Risicokaart compiled by the
Interprovincial Platform (IPO), Statistics Netherlands
(CBS).
One of the most important Dutch climate adaptation plans
focuses on water management. It is called the Delta
Programme (based on the Dutch Water Act; see also Biesbroek
et al. 2007, Veerman 2008), which discursively refers to the
historical “battle against water” of former Dutch Delta plans,
like the coastal zone protection plan (the famous Delta Works)
and the protection against flooding from the major rivers in
the 1990s (Wiering and Driessen 2001). However, climate
adaptation measures need not only concern floods but also low
water levels, decreasing water quality, and ecology.
Adaptation in river management is in fact about river
dynamics: high and low water levels, flood protection, and the
quality and ecological status of flood plains. Indeed, the Delta
Commission’s proposed program also aims to secure a
nationwide fresh water supply and explicitly establishes a link
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with the ‘Space for the River’ policy project, the latest, and
still ongoing, major intervention in Dutch river management
that deals with flood control, flood plain management, nature
conservation, and the improvement of spatial values in flood-
prone areas.  
Dutch water management is mainly divided over two layers
of government: the regional water authorities, frequently
referred to as ‘water boards,’ and the Dutch Ministry of
Transport, Public Works and Water Management
(Rijkswaterstaat). The regional water authorities are
functional authorities that are responsible for water safety,
water supply, and water quality on a subriver basin level,
somewhere in between the provincial and local level. The 26
regional water authorities are organized around hydrological
borders. Historically, the Dutch system of regional water
management links the area-based interest that one has in good
water management with the right to participate in elections or
to be elected and the duty to contribute financially or
personally. Financial contributions are based on the amount
of land one owns or on the value of one’s real estate. Electoral
participation is based on a differentiated system of several
types of stakeholders: inhabitants, house owners, land owners,
industry, and nature conservation organizations. It is a closed
and self-supporting system; those whose interests are at stake
can elect or be elected in the representative bodies of the water
board and make the decisions, but they also pay for the water
management measures in their area (Van Rijswick and
Havekes 2012).  
This relationship of ‘stake, say and pay’ created a shared long-
term responsibility and encouraged sustainable behavior. One
could say that the Dutch water authorities originate from a
communitarian need for collective measures regulating safety
and supply and they evolved into state-based organizations,
though still operating relatively autonomously. This closed
system does not exist at the national level. The national water
agency (Rijkswaterstaat) manages the major rivers and small
parts of the coastal flood prevention measures as well as the
main infrastructure for fresh water supply. The national water
management measures are paid for by all taxpayers and not
only by those who profit from them (Van Rijswick and
Havekes 2012).  
Because the major rivers cross the Dutch borders, one would
expect that the transboundary element would be taken strongly
into account in the national adaptation plan. Indeed, a
transboundary approach is implied in the river basin
management approach put forward by the European Water
Framework Directive (EU 2000) and the European Floods
Directive (EU 2007). Although the plans for the river basins
should be coordinated to improve coherence, each member
state is only responsible for compliance with the directives in
its own part of the river basin. Add to this the soft legal
obligations that best characterize transboundary cooperation
under these directives (Keessen et al. 2008), then the lack of
attention to the transboundary dimension of adaptation
becomes understandable. Perhaps a legal framework for
adaptation at the EU level will raise the transboundary
dimension of adaptation, but currently adaptation has a strong
domestic focus in the Netherlands (Termeer et al. 2011).
The public interest in protection against flooding
Dutch flood control is first and foremost a public concern
managed solely by Dutch governmental bodies (Van Rijswick
and Havekes 2012). Since the 19th century, water management
has been modernized by technical interventions in water
infrastructure (Van der Ven 1993, Van der Woud 2006).
Market players do not have a role in flood management and
both civil society and the general public are merely involved
through their democratic rights to elect Members of Parliament
to control the national water agency, and the board of their
regional water authority. The state and the regional water
authorities care for Dutch citizens ‘by keeping their feet dry.
’ Flood control is a governmental responsibility that every
political party seems to agree upon, either motivated by
reasons of security, solidarity, or the protection of
communities. As the popular Dutch saying goes, there are no
left-wing or right-wing dikes.  
This approach is reflected in safety standards that are
uniformly set for specific regions, distinguishing the high-risk
Western part from other, lower risk parts of the country, and
established by law, to which Dutch primary flood defences
must conform. Nonconformity makes the state or the water
board liable for flood damage (Gilissen and Schueler 2012,
Van Rijswick and Havekes 2012). These safety standards are
among the most ambitious in the world (Aerts et al. 2008).
The high-risk western part of the country is protected against
flooding by dikes. The legal safety norm that applies to these
dikes is that they should be high enough to protect against
water levels expected to occur once every 10,000 years
(Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management
2009). After the near disastrous events of 1993 and 1995, when
the Rhine and Meuse Rivers reached extreme and unexpected
high levels of water, and the Netherlands just escaped large-
scale flooding, the first reflex response was to strengthen the
dikes to ensure that the safety standards were met (Aerts and
Droogers 2004). The second response, however, was to
actually reconsider the prevailing risk strategy. The
desirability of an approach that was predominantly focused
on the prevention of floods and not on the potential
consequences of flooding, including flood preparedness, was
now being publicly discussed.  
The physical changes sparked a discussion that caused the
national water agency and the regional water authorities to
open up their decision making processes and become more
transparent on the rationales for flood safety strategies. This
increased the discursive space for a more nature friendly and
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spatially relevant policy project called Space for the River,
which was carried out in the following years (Ministry of
Transport, Public Works and Water Management 2006). It
also gave way to a discussion about market-based policy
instruments in Dutch flood policy, in particular whether
insurance could complement governmental responsibilities
(Aerts and Botzen 2011). Moving in the direction of a different
approach to flood risks implied that the discourse of the water
experts had to evolve from a “battle against water” storyline,
which went hand in hand with reducing flood probabilities and
relying on technical flood defence measures, toward the
acceptance of possible flood occurrences and consequences
and investigating measures to reduce these consequences and
to shift part of the responsibility to private parties (Immink
2007, Meijerink and Dicke 2008) and other governmental
authorities, such as municipalities.  
At first, new approaches were predominantly framed in the
discussion as flood risk strategies in themselves and not as
adaptation to climate change strategies. Only after Hurricane
Katrina and Al Gore’s apocalyptic message in “An
Inconvenient Truth,” in which the Netherlands was visualized
as one of the poor deluged countries, did climate change and
adaptation become a societal and politically salient issue
(Ligtvoet et al. 2009). Flood safety used to be considered a
public concern by all political philosophies for protection for
all, for cost-benefit or security reasons. However, the potential
increase of flood risks in the context of climate change
adaptation has led to a renewed discussion of flood risk
management. As part of the debate on the national adaptation
policy, various strategies to adapt to future extremes are being
considered (Kabat et al. 2005): (1) proceed with building ever
higher and larger dikes, but now build climate-proof dikes; (2)
create a multilayered strategy, which includes flood defence
but also flood preparation measures and evacuation plans; and
(3) proceed with ‘Space for the River’ measures, which
integrate nature conservation, land use planning, and water
management. 
Essentially, a choice has to be made between the traditional
approach to flood prevention by endlessly heightening dikes
and new approaches to flood risk management, which are not
only based on flood probabilities but also on flood
consequences (Aerts et al. 2008). Introducing a multilayered
strategy results in a more encompassing risk-oriented flood
strategy, in line with the European Floods Directive (EU
2007). It would expand the range of measures from flood
defence by building dikes to spatial development and building
flood mitigation measures, flood preparation, and flood
response (Government of The Netherlands 2009) and also
expand the range of competent authorities within provinces
and municipalities. It would thus end the closed financing
system and shift to a system based on general taxes by making
flood protection one of the many public tasks to be dealt with
by national and local governments. This choice cannot be
made by solely referring to the principle of resilience. Each
scenario could improve social-ecological resilience. The
question is what sort of resilient society the Dutch want to
create. This is where our theoretical framework provides an
explanation.  
Limited rights proponents might support the decision to build
ever higher dikes, because dikes provide safety. However, they
would loath paying higher taxes to allow the competent water
authorities or other governments to secure enormous dikes if
other scenarios of shared responsibility are possible and they
therefore prefer a multilayered strategy. From a liberal point
of view, the high costs of technical adaptation measures are
problematic in so far as no difference is made between people
who choose to live in certain riskier areas, and those who
expressly avoid such a risk by taking out insurance (if
available), building safer houses, or moving to another, safer
region. They would consider it fair to allow those who want
to live in dangerous places to take responsibility for protecting
themselves. Therefore, they would opt for the multilayered
strategy and propose the financing of dikes from local budgets.
 
From a utilitarian perspective, it is important to consider
whether it is cost-effective to heighten the dikes considering
the potential consequences of a flood occurrence. They would
certainly want to investigate the cost-effectiveness of a
multilayered strategy and the Space for the River Strategy.
From a more state-based and collectivist perspective, flood
protection should remain a state responsibility. They would
oppose a multilayered strategy in so far as it negatively affects
vulnerable groups, who are more likely to live in flood-prone
areas but lack the finances to relocate or to pay for flood
insurance. Communitarian thinkers are divided. Environmental
communitarians would opt for the Space for the River policy
to improve the ecological richness of river basins, whereas
coastal or riverine communitarians may prefer maintaining the
status quo and hence the dikes. Some communities may feel
threatened by the changes in land use caused by the Space for
the River policy and feel unprepared to deal with floods as
required under a multilayered strategy. Because both liberal
and more collectivistic proponents acknowledge and support
the important role of government in securing people from flood
risks, preventive measures continue to occupy center stage in
Dutch flood risk strategies although other options are taken in
consideration as well (www.deltacommissaris.nl/english/).
The public interest in fresh water supply
The current Dutch approach to water scarcity is based on the
legal notion that water is a public good, which can be freely
used in times of abundance but is publicly managed in times
of drought (Van Rijswick and Havekes 2012). In the
Netherlands, the responsibility of supplying fresh water is
considered to be a public task and until today the government
has provided all fresh water users, as much as possible, with
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enough water for their specific needs such as drinking water,
water for agriculture, and cooling water for industry and
energy. The national government takes care of the fresh water
supply of the greater rivers and lakes, and regional water
authorities manage all other waters. The government then uses
water infrastructure works to transfer river water from one
area to another in accordance with water agreements between
these areas and it regulates the water use of the various
functions such as drinking water and navigation.  
The government has established a water use hierarchy by law
to distribute water in times of water scarcity (Ministry of
Transport, Public Works and Water Management 2009).
Water safety, i.e., the stability of flood defenses, and the
prevention of irreversible harm to nature come first, drinking
water and energy supply come second, followed by high value
use, such as the temporary irrigation of capital intensive crops
and industrial process water. The fourth category comprises
shipping, agriculture, nature (in the absence of irreversible
damage), industry, water recreation, and inland fisheries and
other interests (Van Rijswick and Havekes 2012). Tradable
water rights or a market-based approach have never existed
because a fresh water supply has only rarely been a problem
(Van Rijswick and Havekes 2012). Indeed, the traditional
Dutch approach is to use pumping stations to direct water
quickly toward the sea to enable living and farming on low-
lying land. However, climate change, with its forecast
droughts and sea level rises, forces the Dutch to consider fresh
water supply as a new problem in water management.  
The Delta Programme Committee is discussing whether the
current way of dealing with water scarcity should persist or if
a new way of dealing with this issue should be developed. The
challenge is finding a just balance between public and private
responsibility. Currently the adaptation approach is being
developed for the next few decades, explicitly paying attention
to the question of what public interest is at stake and what the
role of public and private parties in the future should be. At
the same time though, several innovative initiatives are
experimenting with new ways to deal with water scarcity as a
climate-related problem. Local water storage areas, which are
also useful in times of flooding, can be used to store water for
periods of drought. Traditionally, regional water authorities
construct and manage water storage areas for flood
management. At the moment, private parties are developing
water storage to prevent damage from drought. It is
particularly interesting for farmers because their water use has
a low priority in the public water hierarchy that is used to
distribute water in times of drought (Van Rijswick and
Havekes 2012). The idea is to use private land for storing water
in times of abundance. The owner of the stored water can then
use it, sell it, or share it within a cooperative in times of drought.
 
The experiments clearly show a shift in water scarcity and
drought management from a more communitarian and
collectivist (state-based) approach toward a liberal approach.
As stated above, socialist thinking would never allow a
fundamental resource such as water to be subjected to market
forces, while a libertarian would consider it a good thing, being
independent of environmental concerns. Again, the liberal
position chose a middle ground between these two extremes,
allowing the government to regulate the water market to
safeguard everyone’s basic water rights. However, it is
communitarian thinking that sparked this shift. Local farming
communities usually profit from the current arrangement
because they have the necessary water resources available, but
they are worst hit by droughts because of their low position in
the public water hierarchy system. Consequently, they act on
the perception that droughts will occur more frequently, which
challenges the current legal system. The choice to focus more
on a liberal and even libertarian solution should be the result
of an explicit democratic process, and should not be the sole
implication of a more resilient adaptation strategy. The same
holds true for taking an economic approach to the scarcity of
water resources. If experiments with the privatization of
certain water resources turn out to be more cost-effective than
maintaining the traditional public approach, this does not mean
that the question concerning privatization is answered. A cost-
benefit analysis points to a utilitarian normative framework,
which is only one among many. It is typical that while the
Delta Programme Committee is debating which direction
should be taken, in practice initiatives have already been
developed. Again, taking crucial decisions on scarcity and
drought management should not happen implicitly, but
explicitly, with reference to the value orientations described
above.
Balancing the public interest in flood protection with
fresh water supply and ecosystem protection
In 1953 the Dutch province of Zeeland was confronted with
a major sea storm surge, with over 1800 lives lost. The storm
surge peak coincided with the spring high water tide in the
North Sea and left the Dutch with a national trauma that still
determines the attitude of the people from Zeeland toward
water management and flood protection. After the flooding,
the concern for safety led to the development of the Delta
Works. The Delta Works cut the delta of Zeeland almost
completely off from the sea. The Haringvliet Dam was
completed in 1970. It offers safety to the inhabitants of the
area and at the same time benefits agriculture by creating a
freshwater reservoir and additional land for agricultural use.
However, it also meant that the natural estuarian dynamic of
the Rhine was lost, which led to a thorough change of the river
landscape, caused the death of many organisms, and seriously
hindered fish migration. Moreover, the dam resulted in
pollution of the riverbed and poor chemical and ecological
status of the water.  
These negative environmental consequences led the Dutch
government in close cooperation with other countries sharing
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the river basin of the Rhine and the Meuse to propose opening
the dam to improve the ecological quality of the estuary
without reducing flood safety. From the beginning, the so-
called ‘Crack decision,’ which refers to the temporary opening
of the Haringvliet Dam, led to resistance in the region.
Regional parties, in particular water boards and municipalities,
pointed to the enormous uncertainty of the development of the
ecological values of the river, the difficulty in managing the
salt intrusion, the uncertain consequences for navigation, and
the uncertain consequences of a fluctuating water level. Private
parties were concerned about their fresh water supply, in
particular farmers[1] and the publicly owned drinking water
companies. Their criticism and the uncertainty led to the
decision to only slightly open the locks at high tides. This was
not sufficient to restore the estuary and improve its ecological
status. Fish migration would however improve.  
Despite this careful approach, regional parties remained
skeptical. They questioned the independence of the
environmental impact assessment and various parties wanted
additional research to be carried out. Finally, the Crack
decision was taken in 2000.[2] It projected that the locks of the
Haringvliet Dam would slightly open at high tides in 2005. In
addition, a link was established with the Delta nature project,
which aimed to gain 3000 hectares of new wetlands in the
Delta. Further measures to improve the ecological status
would only be taken with a careful step-by-step approach,
which offers the opportunity to take better informed decisions
and to deal with uncertainty and changing circumstances. An
important precondition for the operationalization of the Crack
decision was that compensatory measures would be taken to
guarantee fresh water supply. This should take place through
alternative fresh water supply canals, which would however
reduce agricultural land use. These measures proved so
controversial that they, and hence the Crack decision, could
not be executed.  
The regional resistance led to a postponement until 2008 and
then to a further postponement to December 2010. The
postponement severed the link between the Crack decision
and the Delta Nature project, to the detriment of the ambition
to create integrated spatial development. After the formation
of a right-wing and communitarian government in September
2010, it seemed that the postponements would end in
abandoning the whole decision. However, the proposed
withdrawal of the Crack decision had serious legal and
diplomatic consequences because the Netherlands had
committed itself in the coordinated international river basin
management plans for the rivers Rhine and Meuse to
implement the Crack decision. The other riparian states were
expecting the implementation of the decision to improve fish
migration. After strong pressure from the European
Commission and the international river basin members and
because of formal obligations following from international
and European environmental law as well as a lack of proper
alternatives to improve ecological status or fish migration, it
seems that compensatory measures will be realized and the
locks will finally be opened.  
The case of the Haringvliet locks shows a conflict between a
variety of interests. The conflict between flood safety and the
creation of resilient ecosystems, including fish migration, can
be significantly reduced through opening the Haringvliet
locks. However, opening the locks creates a conflict between
the ecological requirements and the fresh water supply for
agriculture, industry, and drinking water companies, which is
not so easy to solve. According to our framework, there are
quite a number of options. On the one hand, from a
communitarian and libertarian perspective, the government
should try to reconcile ecosystem protection with the interests
of the farming communities. For a traditional communitarian,
the farmers’ way of life in this area must simply remain
possible, while the libertarian immediately rejects attempts to
favor nature over private property.  
On the other hand, opening the locks may be defended from
a liberal and utilitarian perspective. Liberals may prefer to
open the locks in view of international commitments and
advocate some form of compensation. They would not agree
with the demanding plan of guaranteeing farmers their current
share of fresh water. From a utilitarian perspective, the return
of proper fish migration will benefit fishermen and people who
like to see nature being restored, and affects numerous
economic interests on an international scale. This could
outrank local farmers’ interest in fresh water. Moreover, the
more idealistic environmentalist form of communitarianism
backs opening the locks because it underlines the independent
importance of ecological biodiversity in a community and
attributes independent value to the restoration of the natural
ecological system. In the end, the government chose to open
the locks, favoring the latter perspectives over the former.
However, more than the other examples, this example not only
showed the conflict of the underlying normative positions, but
also exhibited an actual political struggle between different
interests and visions. Although such a struggle is important,
it has to be noted that an open discussion only occurred at a
late stage and was strongly influenced by the European and
transboundary dimension of the issue. This is disappointing,
because fundamental discussions about different political
views should be held before decisions are taken.
DISCUSSION
The three cases analyzed show that long-standing practices in
the Netherlands are put to the test when both projected and
real climate changes have to be taken into account. Adaptation
policies, which frequently conflict with old policies, are being
proposed. They indicate a shift in the normative framework
that determines what actions are in the public interest. This
change is significant because flood defence and water
management have been a public responsibility in the
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Netherlands since the 19th century. Several adaptation
strategies question this choice as they seek to complement the
dominant state-based preventive approach with other
approaches, which focus more on preparedness and damage
control and rely more on private initiatives, including private
insurance. Additionally, although fresh water supply and the
improvement of the resilience of ecological systems have been
recognized as being in the public interest, they are the subject
of controversy because these tasks easily provoke conflicts
with other interests such as economic development and, in the
case of ecology, agriculture.  
The general shift in perspective can be framed in two ways.
First, there is the division between the public and private
societal domain, and the responsibilities that belong to each
of these spheres. As discussed, a libertarian perspective shows
a limited view of responsibility in the public, governmental
sphere, whereas a more collectivist approach entertains the
opposite opinion. Both in the first case, on new ways to deal
with the threat of flooding, and in the second case, on managing
the water supply, this distinction is highly informative. The
second shift relates to the definition of the public interest and
its relation with individual rights. Whereas some political
theories, such as liberalism, solely think in terms of rights,
communitarian and utilitarian thought are much more
concerned with the interest for the whole of society, seen as a
single entity. In the Haringvliet locks case, it became clear
how difficult it is to resolve a dispute in a situation in which
parties refer to different normative backgrounds. For how do
you convince someone who reasons according to his rights or
way of life of the need to preserve ecological biodiversity? 
As to the division between public and private societal domains,
the consensus over Dutch water management as a predominant
public responsibility is lost and the government in charge in
2012 seemed to at least consider shifting toward a more liberal
or even libertarian position as it strives to improve resilience
in the face of climate change. The long held saying that water
management is not a political issue may no longer be true.
Different political views regarding the division of public and
private responsibilities are not only visible with regard to flood
defence, but also with regard to the use of fresh water for
agriculture. Because agricultural water use has a low ranking
in the publicly established water hierarchy that applies in times
of drought, dry periods have sparked among farmers a
willingness to be responsible for their own water use. Many
farmers participate in experiments to improve their resilience
to drought through private water storage.  
The experimental development of private water storage shows
that if water shortage becomes a more structural phenomenon
in the Netherlands because of climate change, it can trigger a
shift from public to private responsibilities unless stakeholders
can count on the government to take care of the fresh water
supply. The adaptation discussion has not dramatically altered
the consensus regarding flood safety, which is shared by all
political theories from libertarians to socialists. However, the
space for the river project reveals that even here the consensus
is cracking. It would probably take a serious flood to
completely alter this situation. Nevertheless, it can be safely
concluded that the direction taken in adaptation strategies to
increase resilience entails a political choice because the
alternatives to classic Dutch water management solutions do
not equally appeal to every political theory. As we have seen,
other methods of land use and water supply easily come into
conflict with the normative values and established rights of
communities. To give another example, although insurance is
appealing from a liberal and libertarian perspective, it is not
from a socialist perspective for fear that those who are too
poor to pay for insurance will not be compensated for damage.
 
Considering the second aspect, the relation between the
collective public interest and individual rights shifts with
regard to the importance given to nature conservation and
ecological improvement can definitely be witnessed. These
shifts could be due to contemporary neo-liberal tendencies in
the Dutch government and politics. Since the middle of the
last century the government started to take care of nature
conservation and ecology, and over the years public
responsibility has intensified. However, a case such as the
Haringvliet locks debacle reveals that this new attitude could
be in swift decline. When the farming community protested,
their rights to property and their livelihood temporarily
superseded the interests of restoring fish migration and
providing ecological and economic benefits for the much
larger European river basins. Indeed, a positive aspect of the
Haringvliet locks case was that ideas and values were made
explicit because of the protests. This shows the different
meanings that resilience can acquire in adaptation strategies
and how crucial it is to deal with these differences in order to
realize a legitimate and resilient strategy.
CONCLUSIONS
Although adaptation policies generally aim to decrease
vulnerability and increase resilience, their content can differ
significantly. Obviously, there are no ‘one size fits all’
solutions, but just referring to the increasing resilience as a
reason for an adaptation strategy does not explain which
meaning is given to resilience in a particular social context.
Charting the normative value orientations that underlie an
adaptation strategy makes this explicit. Looking at the Dutch
adaptation strategies, it is clear that climate change has sparked
new and different thinking, which implicitly questions the old
normative structure of seeing water management as a public,
governmental responsibility. This stresses the point that
thinking about increasing social-ecological resilience in the
face of climate change implies thinking about what sort of
society one wants to make resilient. How important are the
rights of people threatened by flooding? How should one
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distribute water in times of drought? How should a concern
for ecological values be represented in decision making
procedures? These questions have to be answered in a
democratically, transparent and participatory way, before
adaptation policies can focus on realizing resilient solutions
that can count on broad societal support. 
Therefore, focusing on transparent and legitimate decision
making in the development of adaptation strategies is of
paramount importance. Sadly, the examples set in the Dutch
case studies do not bode well. New and challenging ideas and
reinterpretations of the interests involved in adaptation were
rarely accompanied by conscious decisions and transparent
visions that explain the underlying shifting normative values.
In this contribution, we have attempted to clarify normative
values that determine the meaning people assign to increasing
resilience to broaden the discussion about resilience, and to
place the concept of resilience in a social context. Although
the Dutch cases showed an implicit change in politics and
normative viewpoints, many of the traditional values are still
safeguarded. For example, in flood management new, more
utilitarian and liberal approaches have not yet resulted in the
abandonment of the old safety standards although they are
under discussion. Flood management is still one of the most
important and broadly accepted public tasks. Consciously or
not, the existing institutional water management structures, in
the form of the regional water authorities, are defending the
existing preventive approach, including the traditional value
of high safety standards, which are based on consensus
surrounding the values of security and protection for all against
flooding.  
Considering the need to increase resilience in the face of
climate change, the challenge is to develop a correct and fair
mix between public and private responsibilities, without
necessarily losing the valuable elements of present Dutch
water management. On the basis of the empirical cases, we
can stress the reliance on solidarity, the keen eye for (technical)
prevention, the functional specialization of water agencies,
and the strong involvement of stakeholders as strong
ingredients of a resilient strategy. If increasing societal
resilience warrants a shift from public toward private
responsibilities, public debate should follow concerning the
changing role of government and what kind of adaptation
policy it defines as being in the public interest. Without this,
specific private parties, but also the public at large, do not
become fully aware of this shift and will be confronted with
responsibilities they are not willing or even able to accept. In
the end that will lead to a lack of legitimacy surrounding
adaptation policies and not to the desired improvement of
social-ecological resilience.
 
[1]
 They own 80% of the land, employ 8.8% of the population
of Zeeland, and produce 3% to 7% added value depending on
whether their own produce or the entire chain is included in
the calculation. See: http://www.zeeland.nl/index?lng=en.
[2]
 Besluit Beheer Haringvlietsluizen, 5 June 2000
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